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Abstract
Background: In 2002 we investigated an outbreak comprising 231 patients in Norway, caused by
Pseudomonas aeruginosa and linked to the use of contaminated mouth swabs called Dent-O-Sept.
Here we describe the extent of contamination of the swabs, and identify critical points in the
production process that made the contamination possible, in order to prevent future outbreaks.
Methods:  Environmental investigation with microbiological examination of production,
ingredients and product, molecular typing of bacteria and a system audit of production.
Results: Of the 1565 swabs examined from 149 different production batches the outbreak strain
of P. aeruginosa was detected in 76 swabs from 12 batches produced in 2001 and 2002. In total more
than 250 swabs were contaminated with one or more microbial species. P. aeruginosa was detected
from different spots along the production line. The audit revealed serious breeches of production
regulations. Health care institutions reported non-proper use of the swabs and weaknesses in their
purchasing systems.
Conclusion: Biofilm formation in the wet part of the production is the most plausible explanation
for the continuous contamination of the swabs with P. aeruginosa over a period of at least 30 weeks.
When not abiding to production regulations fatal consequences for the users may ensue. For the
most vulnerable patient groups only documented quality-controlled, high-level disinfected products
and items should be used in the oropharynx.
Background
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a gram-negative, obligate aerobe
rod-shaped bacterium with minimal nutritional require-
ments. It is often found in moist environment and can
cause infections in immunocompromised or otherwise
susceptible hosts [1,2]. Numerous outbreaks have been
associated with faulty or unclean medical equipment or
products [3-9], contaminations from personnel or envi-
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ronmental reservoirs [10-16]. Cross-colonization and
cross-contamination within hospitals has been docu-
mented [13,17,18].
We have reported a major, nationwide outbreak of Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa infection in 24 Norwegian hospitals
[19]. The outbreak comprised of 231 patients with a gen-
otypically identical strain of P. aeruginosa from the period
November 2000 to December 2002, of which 39 were
blood culture positive. Seventy-one infected patients, all
of whom had severe underlying diseases, died while hos-
pitalized. The outbreak strain was susceptible to all anti-
pseudomonas antibiotics (ceftazidime, ciprofloxacin,
imipenem-cilastadine and tobramycin). However, some
of the isolates cultured late in the outbreak had developed
intermediate susceptibility or full resistance to ceftazi-
dime or aztreonam (MIC 96 and 24 mg/L, respectively).
The outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was traced to a mouth
swab called Dent-O-Sept. This is a clean, non-sterile,
moist sponge-on-a-stick produced in Norway, which
according to the Norwegian text on the wrap is an antisep-
tic single-use swab for mouth hygiene (Figure 1). (The
English text on the wrap does not contain the word anti-
septic.) This swab was the dominant product of its kind on
the Norwegian market, being widely used in hospitals,
long-term care facilities and in home care. Approximately
one million swabs were sold in Norway per year. Small
quantities were also exported to Denmark and Sweden. As
soon as the connection between the swab and the out-
break was identified the company ceased production at its
single facility and recalled the product.
The objective of this study is to examine how Pseudomonas
aeruginosa contaminated the product, assess the extent of
the contamination and identify critical points in the pro-
duction process that made the contamination possible.
Methods
Setting
Norway has a population of 4.5 million people and
approximately 65 general hospitals and around 1000
health care institutions for the elderly. There are 22 medi-
cal microbiological laboratories in the country providing
general bacteriological culturing services. Through the
European Economic Area Agreement Norway abides by
much of the legislation within the European Union,
including European Council Directive 93/42/EEC con-
cerning medical devices [20].
Investigation of contaminated product
The Norwegian Institute of Public Health (NIPH) coordi-
nated the national outbreak investigation. Immediately
after the recall of the product, we asked all hospitals to
report to NIPH which batches of the Dent-O-Sept swab
they had in store. The rest of the health care services were
asked in a newsletter from NIPH to do the same. A batch
number printed on the wrap indicated the week and year
of production. Up to 10 swabs of each available batch of
the product were examined at the microbiological labora-
tory which the health care institution normally used. We
asked the laboratories to identify and deep freeze monoc-
ultures of all findings of gram-negative rods, Staphylococ-
cus aureus, streptococci and enterococci. Other microbes
like those often included in gram-positive mixed flora
(micrococci and coagulase negative staphylococci) and
Bacillus spp. were to be noted and reported.
System audit and additional investigations
The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs organized a
system audit of the manufacturer on 12 – 15 April 2002
by studying documents, interviewing selected personnel
and inspecting the premises, including microbiological
sampling of tap water, swabbing of different places along
the production lane and culturing of stored and packed
samples of the product. These samples were cultured at
the municipal Food Control Authority. Isolates of P. aeru-
ginosa were sent for genotyping as described below.
On request from the producer Snøgg Industri AS, the lab-
oratory at the municipal Food Control Authority per-
formed environmental sampling in addition to what had
been performed during the system audit described above.
The production site had been left untouched after the pro-
duction had ceased on 9 April 2002. In May, quantitative
analysis of P. aeruginosa was performed on the moisturiz-
ing liquid of 16 wrapped swabs taken from four boxes
with swabs produced on the same day and from 15 swabs
from three boxes with swabs produced at different times
during two consecutive days.
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab Figure 1
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab. The English text on the wrap 
reads: "Premoistened foam swab for mouth hygiene. Satu-
rated with glycerine and mouthwater".Annals of Clinical Microbiology and Antimicrobials 2007, 6:3 http://www.ann-clinmicrob.com/content/6/1/3
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From the bottom of the steel tank a blue pipe connects to
a level measuring device (Figure 2). In May 2002 samples
were taken directly from remaining water in the blue con-
necting pipe and from water flushed through the level
measuring device.
Between 28 May and 5 June 2002 water samples were
taken from water taps located several places on the pro-
duction site and from a 1 m chipped, rubber hose leading
from a faucet with municipal water to the steel tank The
hose had not been replaced in an estimated seven years.
Quantitative analysis of P. aeruginosa was performed [21].
Moisturizing liquid
We performed microbiological analysis [22,23] of each of
the ingredients for the moisturizing liquid used in the pro-
duction of the Dent-O-Sept swab (except tap water). The
total viable aerobic count and specific detection of P. aer-
uginosa were tested in each of the liquids. Then the mois-
turizing liquid undiluted and in 1:10 dilution were tested
for their effect on the outbreak strain and a reference
strain of P. aeruginosa (ATCC 9027 -MicroBioLogics) [24].
Microbiological analyses
Culturing of samples of Dent-O-Sept swabs was per-
formed at local laboratories according to our instruction:
"Brush the swab against both a lactose and blood agar
dish in a rotating manner so all sides of the foam tip
touches the agar. It is not necessary to place the swab in a
growth broth". The isolates were identified by standard
procedures in use by the laboratories.
Culturing of samples from the system audit and the addi-
tional investigation of the production site were performed
at the laboratory of the municipal Food Control Author-
ity. The qualitative analysis of the samples was performed
by direct seeding (except for dry Dent-O-Sept swabs) and
seeding after enrichment overnight in a heart infusion
broth on Kings Agar B and on blood agar. The quantitative
analysis was performed by direct seeding of 0.1 mL undi-
luted or – if heavy contamination was expected – diluted
liquid on Kings Agar B and for some samples also on
blood agar. The plates were incubated at 37°C overnight
before reading.
One isolate of P. aeruginosa from each contaminated pro-
duction batch of swabs and all isolates identified as P. aer-
uginosa from the system audit were sent for genotyping
and compared with the outbreak strain at one or more of
three reference laboratories. The strain of P. aeruginosa
found in the product batch 47.2001 on 8 April 2002 was
defined as the outbreak strain. Isolates of P. aeruginosa
found in the additional investigation of the production
site were not genotyped.
Two of the reference laboratories used a pulsed field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) method developed at St. Olav's
Hospital and the third laboratory used an augmented frac-
Schematic figure showing the wet part of the production of the Dent-O-Sept swab Figure 2
Schematic figure showing the wet part of the production of the Dent-O-Sept swab.
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tion length polymorphism (AFLP) The methods are
described elsewhere [19]. The AFLP and PFGE protocols
were compared and found to be equal in detecting and
discriminating the outbreak strain. If an isolate was not
typeable by PFGE because of excessive activity of endog-
enous endonucleases, it was genotyped with AFLP.
Results
Investigation of contaminated product
NIPH received information about stored batches of the
Dent-O-Sept swab from 59 of the 65 general hospitals,
four other health care services and 20 private persons. Six
of the health care institutions reported that they had not
purchased the Dent-O-Sept swab and five reported that all
remaining batches of the product had been discarded
immediately after the cause of the outbreak was made
public. The culturing results from 1565 swabs from 149
different batches were reported (Table 1). The outbreak
strain of P. aeruginosa was detected in 76 swabs from 12
different batches of the Dent-O-Sept swab produced from
week 38 in 2001 to week 15 in 2002 when production
ceased. These 76 swabs were sent for examination from 13
different hospitals, one private person and from the pro-
ducer. All genotyped strains of P. aeruginosa were identical
to the outbreak strain. The outbreak strain was isolated
from six patients up to ten months before the production
of the first swab found to be contaminated (Figure 3).
In addition to P. aeruginosa another unidentified species
of Pseudomonas  was detected in two swab-batches pro-
duced in weeks 6 in 1995 (one swab) and week 22 in
1999 (nine swabs). The strains from the two batches were
genotypically identical. In total, more than 250 swabs
were found to contain one or more species of micro-
organisms, mainly gram-positive bacteria which were pre-
dominantly discovered in the earlier batches. Gram-nega-
tive rods including Acinetobacter baumanii were isolated in
swabs produced in 1999 and 2001.
System audit and additional investigations
The production process of the swabs was described as fol-
lows: The foam rubber heads and sticks were glued
together manually in private homes of employees who
were following moderate hygiene guidelines.
One batch of moisturizing liquid consisted of: Tap water
(147 liters), 96% ethanol (3 litres), Glycerol (16 litres)
and Vademecum, a commercially available mouth rinse
(6 litres). The main ingredients of the mouth rinse are eth-
anol (44%) and sodium benzoate (5.25%). The final con-
centration in the Dent-O-Sept moisturizing liquid was
calculated to be 2.3% ethanol; 9.3% glycerol and 0.18%
sodium benzoate [25].
A new batch of the liquid was prepared in the following
way every week of production: The tap water was filled
into a large steel tank with a lid on Friday, and then heated
to 95°C the following day in an automated but uncon-
trolled process (Figure 2). On Monday the other ingredi-
ents were added and the solution stirred manually with a
steel rod.
Packing, moisturizing and sealing of the swabs were done
in an automated packing machine, Fuji Wrapper II, FW
3400. The moisturizing liquid was led from an orifice at
the bottom of the steel tank through a pipe, via a pump
and a dosing valve ending in the packing machine close to
the heat sealer. This piping system was approximately 3.5
meters long and a locally made adaptation to the packing
machine. The tank and pipe were made of acid resistant
stainless steel.
Dry swabs were fed on a conveyer belt and approximately
2.0–2.5 grams of liquid were sprayed into the aluminium-
plastic laminate wrap right before heat sealing. Staff tested
the bags for air tightness by squeezing ten bags at the time
when coming out of the machine before packing.
At the end of each working day, the remaining liquid was
kept in the steel tank. Before start of production the next
morning the moisturizing liquid was stirred using a steel
rod that first was washed with soap and water and then
disinfected. On Fridays when the week's production was
finished the remaining moisturizing liquid was emptied
from the tank. The tank was then flushed with high pres-
sured hot water (> 60°C). Then 30 litres of lukewarm
water was added together with 1.5 dL of disinfectant
("FAWA Desinfekt" contains 1–5% by weight of alkyl
dimethyl benzyl ammonium chloride, a quaternary
ammonium compound). The tank and lid were scrubbed
and the solution pumped into the pipes of the packing
machine until all moisturizing liquid was assumed to be
replaced. After standing for 10–15 minutes the tank was
emptied and flushed again with high pressured hot water.
Then 30 litres of hot water (73–80°C) was filled in the
tank and pumped through the pipes of the packing
machine until the disinfectant was assumed to be rinsed
out. The producer had no quality assurance routines for
checking temperatures, composition of the moisturizing
liquid during the week or effect of the cleaning and disin-
fection process.
A sample taken from the end capillary nozzle in the pro-
duction facilities was negative on initial culturing, but
growth was noted and the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa
was identified after it had been incubated in a growth
broth. P. aeruginosa was not detected from other points
along the production line, the drain or at other points
sampled in the production room. However, the outbreakAnnals of Clinical Microbiology and Antimicrobials 2007, 6:3 http://www.ann-clinmicrob.com/content/6/1/3
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Table 1: Microbial contamination of different batches of the Dent-O-Sept swab
Production 
week and year
No of swabs 
examined
No of swabs contami-
nated with P. aeruginosa
Other microbes isolated and the number of swabs where they were 
found
15 2002 12 12
11 2002 23 1 3: CNS*, 3: Bacillus sp., 7: GPMF**,
08 2002 12 0 3: CNS*, 1: Micrococci, 1: Diphtheroid rods, 3: GPMF**
07 2002 14 0 5: CNS*, 3: Bacillus sp., 4: Diphtheroid rods, 1: Staph. aureus, 1: Micrococci
06 2002 19 2 1: CNS*, 2: Bacillus sp., 10: GPMF**, 1: enterococcus, 1: Staphylococcus sp.
05 2002 37 2 10: CNS*, 2: Bacillus sp., 4: Micrococci, 8: GPMF**, 2: Mixed flora
04 2002 15 10
51 2001 25 5 7: GPMF**, 1: Colony of mobile rods
50 2001 20 1 5: Bacillus sp., 5: Micrococci, 6: GPMF**
48 2001 1 0
47 2001 32 16 1: CNS*, 9: Bacillus sp., 3: Gram-negative rods,
45 2001 11 0 2: Bacillus sp., 3: Micrococci
43 2001 16 5 1: Micrococci
42 2001 13 1 1: Bacillus sp., 2: Gram-positive cocci, 7: Mixed flora, 1: Staphylococcus?
41 2001 28 18 1: CNS*, 3: Bacillus sp.
39 2001 15 0 1: CNS*, 2: Bacillus sp., 2: Micrococci, 1: GPMF**, 1: Streptococcus Equisimilis 
group G., 1: Mould
38 2001 26 3 4: CNS*, 1: Bacillus sp., 1: Micrococci, 1: Yeast
36 2001 21 0 1: Micrococci, 3: GPMF**, 1: Enterocci, 1: Fungus
34 2001 34 0 1: CNS*, 4: Bacillus sp., 1: Micrococci, 2: GPMF**
29 2001 2 0 2: CNS*, 2: Micrococci,
27 2001 16 0 1: Bacillus sp.
24 2001 21 0 1: Bacillus sp., 3: Micrococci, 2: GPMF**
22 2001 11 0 3: CNS*
19 2001 13 0
18 2001 17 0
17 2001 18 0 4: CNS*, 1: Bacillus sp., 1: GPMF**, 1: α-hemolytic Streptococcus, 1: Acinetobacter 
sp.
13 2001 14 0 2: CNS*, 2: Bacillus sp.,
12 2001 10 0 1: CNS*, 3: Bacillus sp., 1: Gram-negative rods
11 2001 10 0
09 2001 11 0 2: CNS*, 1: Bacillus sp.
07 2001 29 0 5: CNS*, 2: GPMF**
05 2001 21¶ 0 7: CNS*, 3: Bacillus sp., 2: Yeast, 2: Acinetobacter baumanii
04 2001 14 0 2: CNS*, 3: Bacillus sp.
Total 2000 286 0 26: CNS*, 11: Bacillus sp., 3: Staph. aureus, 2: Micrococci, 1: Yeast, 1: Mould, 1: 
Candida albicans
Total 1999 164 0 11: CNS*, 7: Bacillus, 2: Gram-positive spore forming, 1: Gram-negative rods, 
1: Staph. aureus, 1: Yeast, 1: Pseudomonas sp. (not P. aeruginosa)
Total 1998 181 0 6: CNS*, 7: Bacillus sp., 3: Micrococci, 1: GPMF**, 1: Yeast, 2: Mould
Total 1997 139 0 12: CNS*, 2: GPMF**, 7: Bacillus sp., 1: Micrococci, 1: Yeast, 1: Mould
Total 1996 63 0 1: Streptococcus pyogenes
Total 1995 64 0 3: CNS*, 1: Bacillus sp., 1: Micrococci, 2: Enterococci, 11: Staph. aureus, 1: 
Pseudomonas sp. (not P. aeruginosa)
Total 1994 24 0
Total 1993 11 0
1992 and older 52 0 1: CNS*, 5: Bacillus sp., 1: Micrococci
* CNS: Coagulase negative staphylococci
** GPMF: Gram-positive mixed flora
¶ For 5 of the examined swabs the wraps had been opened before arrival to the laboratory.Annals of Clinical Microbiology and Antimicrobials 2007, 6:3 http://www.ann-clinmicrob.com/content/6/1/3
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strain was detected in packed samples of the product
batch 15.02 stored on the premises.
The system audit concluded that the production deviated
from the existing regulations in several areas:
• The production process, including the recipe for Dent-
O-Sept, did not ensure that the product had the qualities
and properties stated by the producer nor that the risk of
contamination was avoided or reduced to a minimum.
• Neither the boxes nor wraps of the Dent-O-Sept gave the
user the necessary information. The CE (Communauté
Européenne) marking was unjust because the producer's
declaration of conformity with the regulations, including
the risk analysis, was poorly based and documented. The
technical documentation did not give a third party a basis
for assessing whether the device was in accordance with
the demands of the regulations.
• The producer did not comply with the obligation to
report defects and deficiencies in medical devices to
national health officials and had not adequately followed
up errors in the production demonstrated in an external
review in 1999.
The additional investigations revealed there was a wide
variety in the bacterial load of P. aeruginosa in swabs pro-
duced on the same day and even at the same time of day
ranging from 50 to 10000 CFU per mL liquid in the five
positive swabs of the 16 examined (Table 2).
P. aeruginosa was cultured from the steel rod after both of
the two attempts of cleaning and disinfection were per-
formed. P. aeruginosa was also cultured from the blue con-
necting pipe and the level measuring device. Water
samples taken from the rubber hose on two separate dates
yielded >300 and 1400 CFU of P. aeruginosa per 250 mL
of water. On a third date water samples showed 140 and
Epidemic curve Figure 3
Epidemic curve. Number of cases with the outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa by month and year of the first positive 
culture result. Production period for Dent-O-Sept swabs contaminated with P. aeruginosa
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170 CFU of P. aeruginosa per 500 mL of water after 15
minutes of flushing and 55 and 66 CFU of P. aeruginosa
per 500 mL of water after 45 minutes. P. aeruginosa was
not detected in water from the tap after removing the rub-
ber hose or from any other water tap on the production
site or nearby premises.
Moisturizing liquid and main disinfectant
No bacteria were detected in any of the ingredients for the
moisturizing liquid. When the outbreak strain of P. aeru-
ginosa was added to the Dent-O-Sept solution and to the
two concentrations of the disinfectant we observed a 6 log
reduction in 15 minutes and for the 1:10 diluted Dent-O-
Sept solution a 6 log reduction after 3–6 hours (Table 3).
For the reference strain (ATCC 9027) there was a 6 log
reduction in 15 minutes for all four liquids.
Discussion
Contamination of the swabs
We have described how the Dent-o-sept mouth swabs
were contaminated with P. aeruginosa during production
and consequently caused a major outbreak. Genotypically
identical strains of P. aeruginosa were isolated from 231
patients. The same genotype of P. aeruginosa was detected
in batches of Dent-O-Sept swabs produced from week 38
in 2001 while the first patient with the outbreak strain was
sampled in December 2000, ten months earlier. This can
be coincidental or due to the fact that P. aeruginosa in
almost all instances is an obligate aerobe and will suc-
cumb over time as the oxygen inside the wrap is used
[26,27]. Swabs from 12 different production weeks were
found to be contaminated. Oxygen depletion within the
wrap may have lowered the ability to detect P. aeruginosa
especially in older swabs where it had been present. We
did not recommend the laboratories to use a growth broth
when culturing the swabs. This may have decreased the
culturing sensitivity and prevented us from detecting P.
aeruginosa in more batches of the swabs.
The finding of genotypically identical strains of another
species of Pseudomonas four years apart indicate that also
other bacteria could remain in the production line for
years. The multitude of gram-positive bacteria found in
many of the swabs examined and which survived many
years in the wrap, more probably stem from the dry part
of the production. Although most of the micro-organisms
are harmless for healthy people, they can pose a risk to the
susceptible patient. This should be kept in mind when
using clean but non-sterile products on the most vulnera-
ble patients.
Pseudomonas aeruginosa in the production line
P. aeruginosa was detected throughout the wet part of the
production of Dent-O-Sept swabs. Due to the direction of
flow of the liquids through the production line one can
assume that the rubber hose was the first to be contami-
nated either from the tap water or from direct contact with
the orifice of the rubber hose by contaminated hands or
objects. The chipped rubber hose gave ample possibilities
for permanent contamination of P. aeruginosa and other
organisms. The large number of swabs contaminated with
P. aeruginosa and the finding of the outbreak strain in the
production line makes it highly unlikely that the swabs
were contaminated after sealing the wrap.
P. aeruginosa does not grow in the moisturizing liquid
used for the Dent-O-Sept swab. In fact even when added
to a 1:10 diluted solution, the bacteria were rapidly killed.
Still, bacteria were detected in a number of swabs and in
the wet part of the production line. Interestingly the quan-
tity of bacteria varied greatly between swabs even when
produced on the same date and time of day. The most
plausible explanation for these facts is biofilm formation
in the production line.
P. aeruginosa is well known to form biofilms [28-30]. Bio-
films are structured, specialized communities of adherent
microorganisms encased in a complex extrapolymeric
substance matrix [28] which can form on any surface
although some surfaces are known to retard adherence
[29]. When a biofilm is formed and reaches a critical mass
the quorum sensing molecules excreted alter many of the
functions of the bacteria, including slowing its metabo-
lism and increasing the production of a glycocalyx matrix
[27,31]. These and other factors reduces the bacteria's sus-
ceptibility to antibiotics and disinfectants [29,30]. It has
been shown that P. aeruginosa can reappear after biofilms
Table 2: Quantitative analysis of bacterial load of P. aeruginosa of 
the product taken from different boxes produced at different 
times on two consecutive days
Box Sample no Prod. date Prod. time CFU of P. aeruginosa 
per mL
A 1 08.04.2002 - 10000
2 08.04.2002 - 5000
3, 4 08.04.2002 - 0
B 1–4 08.04.2002 - 0
C 1–4 08.04.2002 - 0
D 1 08.04.2002 - 50
2 08.04.2002 - 1000
3 08.04.2002 - 70
4 08.04.2002 - 0
E 1 08.04.2002 08.30 630
2 08.04.2002 08.30 230
3 08.04.2002 08.30 2900
4 08.04.2002 08.30 1100
5 08.04.2002 08.30 100
F 1–5 08.04.2002 14.00 0
G 1–5 09.04.2002 08.30 0Annals of Clinical Microbiology and Antimicrobials 2007, 6:3 http://www.ann-clinmicrob.com/content/6/1/3
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on polyvinylchloride pipes have been exposed to a variety
of disinfectants for seven days [32]. To eradicate the viable
bacteria in a biofilm heat is preferred. Alternatively
mechanical removal or the use of oxidative biocides to
slowly dissolve the biofilm matrix [30] are suggested.
Once a biofilm has formed and matured it can spread to
new locations either through single cell dispersal or the
shedding of clumps of biofilm [27-29].
Biofilm formation in the wet part of the production and
the shedding of clumps of biofilm into the bags with the
Dent-O-Sept swab can explain why P. aeruginosa could
survive in the production line and the uneven distribution
of bacteria in swabs. The hot water used to disinfect did
probably not reach all areas at required temperatures and
the disinfectant might not have had an adequate effect on
the biofilm in all areas.
The mass media gave much attention to the dry part of the
production taking place in private homes. Although this
part most probably did not play a part in the Pseudomonas
outbreak, it is very likely that it could contribute to the
contamination with gram-positive bacteria.
System audit
Medical devices are strictly regulated in Norway and the
legislation is in accordance with EU regulations [20]. The
system audit revealed several violations of the regulations.
The producer knew there had been problems with the pro-
duction earlier due to complaints from customers of some
discoloured swabs and had ordered an external review in
1999. But he had not complied with all the recommenda-
tions given and he could not document that a risk analysis
had been performed. The police started an investigation
of the producer but decided not to press charges. It is also
worth noting that the producer was certified after the ISO
9002 standard (Quality systems – Model for quality assur-
ance in production, installation and servicing) by Det
Norske Veritas (DNV). This large outbreak and the inves-
tigation of the product and production have revealed the
necessity to adhere to the rules and the fatal consequences
that can occur if they are not.
Health care institutions
During the investigation, many health care institutions
discovered severe weaknesses in their purchasing and stor-
ing systems, including finding batches stowed away that
were ten years old and more. Although more important
for other medical devices like sterile equipment, lengthy
storage can also have influenced the bacterial content of
the Dent-O-Sept swabs. The first patient with the outbreak
strain of P. aeruginosa was sampled ten months before the
first swab found to be contaminated was produced. This
can be coincidental or due to the fact that P. aeruginosa in
Table 3: Antimicrobial effect of liquids on ca. 106 CFU per mL of Pseudomonas aeruginosa added. Number of CFU per mL solution at 
time intervals
The outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa
Liquids Sample taken 
immediately after 
adding
15 min. 3 hours 6 hours 24 hours Reduction of CFU after 
exposure
Control. Peptone 
water
1,0 × 10 6 CFU/mL Not done Not done 1,0 × 106 CFU/mL Not done No significant change in CFU 
after 6 hours
Dent-O-Sept 
solution
No growth in sample 
diluted 1:100 *
1 CFU/mL No growth No growth No growth 6 log reduction in 15 min.
Dent-O-Sept 
solution diluted 
1:10
1 × 106 CFU/mL 1–5 × 103 CFU/mL < 10 CFU/mL No growth No growth 2–3 log reduction in 15 min. 
6 log reduction in 3–6 hours
The reference strain ATCC 9027 of P. aeruginosa 
Liquids Sample taken 
immediately after 
adding
15 min. 3 hours 6 hours 24 hours Reduction of CFU after 
exposure
Control. Peptone 
water
1,5 × 10 6 CFU/mL Not done Not done 1,4 × 106 CFU/mL Not done No significant change in CFU 
after 6 hours
Dent-O-Sept 
solution
No growth in sample 
diluted 1:10 *
1 CFU/mL No growth No growth No growth 6 log reduction in 15 min.
Dent-O-Sept 
solution diluted 
1:10
Ca. 106 CFU/mL No growth No growth No growth No growth 6 log reduction in 15 min.
* Not tested in undiluted sampleAnnals of Clinical Microbiology and Antimicrobials 2007, 6:3 http://www.ann-clinmicrob.com/content/6/1/3
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almost all instances is an obligate aerobe and will suc-
cumb over time as the oxygen inside the wrap is used
[26,27]. Other bacteria like gram-positive cocci can sur-
vive for years under these conditions.
The swab was intended for single use only. However,
some health care personnel reported that the swab was
sometimes stored in a glass of water on the patient's night
stand and reused. This practice may have substantially
increased the bacterial load the patients were exposed to
as indicated in a report [33]. The extent of this malpractice
and the impact it had on the size and seriousness of the
outbreak is difficult to assess.
Great responsibility is placed upon the purchaser in the
health care system to ensure that the products bought are
not harmful for the patients. It is also important to have
quality assurance systems that discover flaws in medical
devices and that all errors are being reported. Partly as a
consequence of this outbreak the Norwegian health
authorities have revised their regulations for medical
devices and are currently improving the reporting system
when serious incidents or harm occur. From 2003, medi-
cal practitioners in Norway have been obliged to immedi-
ately warn the Norwegian Institute of Public Health of
cases of infectious diseases suspected to be caused by con-
taminated medical devices.
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab belongs to Medical device
Class 1, which includes most non-invasive medical
devices according to the European Council Directive 93/
42/EEC [20]. The devices must, when used, "not compro-
mise the clinical condition or the safety of patients". "The
devices and manufacturing processes must be designed in
such a way as to eliminate or reduce as far as possible the
risk of infection to the patient, user and third parties."
Beyond this, the directive does not specify the microbial
quality of the product. In comparison pharmaceutical
preparations for use in the respiratory tract are according
to the European Pharmacopoeia classified in a Category 2
where the absence of Pseudomonas aeruginosa needs to be
documented [34]. Medical devices and products have
often been linked to pseudomonas outbreaks [3-9]. This
outbreak has necessitated a reassessment of the guidelines
for preventing infections in critically ill and otherwise sus-
ceptible patients. Oropharyngeal colonization is impor-
tant for the development of ventilator-associated
pneumonia (VAP) [35] and oral care may prevent pneu-
monia [36], but few have addressed whether oral products
other than ventilator or nebuliser equipment need to be
sterile or high-level disinfected for this patient group [37].
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is the most common gram-nega-
tive bacteria causing VAP [38]. We believe that sterility is
not necessary for such products, but only documented
quality-controlled, high-level disinfected items, including
tap water and moist products, should be used in the
oropharynx of this susceptible patient group. It is, how-
ever, also necessary to underline that health care institu-
tions have to use also such seemingly simple devices
properly and that they in this connection under no cir-
cumstances are reusing devices that are intended for sin-
gle-use.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Dent-O-Sept swabs that in 2001–2002
caused one of the largest ever described outbreaks of Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa infection in Norway were contami-
nated during production when the swabs were sprayed
with a purportedly antiseptic moisturizing liquid.
Although the liquid was produced each week, it was con-
taminated with Pseudomonas aeruginosa possibly in the
form of shedded biofilm from the improperly disinfected
mixing tank or associated pipes or hoses. Probably several
tens of thousands swabs from a period of at least one and
a half years were contaminated and then used in the Nor-
wegian health care system.
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